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In the context of this discussion, it is important to understand the distinctions between the active armed forces and the National Guard. Members of the armed forces are in the active military service of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. 16 With the exception of the Coast Guard, members of the armed forces are constrained by the PCA. 17 As
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the U.S. Constitution grants the President control of the operation of the armed forces.
18
Members of the National Guard simultaneously are members of their respective State militias and the Army Federal reserve. 19 The National Guard traditionally operates under the control of the State and territorial governors. 20 In this State capacity, members of the National Guard are not constrained by the PCA and may perform civilian law enforcement functions. 21 However, National Guard personnel may be called into Federal service (or "federalized") by the President. 22 While under Federal status, National Guard members may perform typical disaster relief tasks (such as search and rescue, clearing roads, delivering supplies, and providing medical assistance), but, when federalized, members of the Guard are subject to the PCA, and they may not perform law enforcement functions unless pursuant to a PCA exception. 20 Id. at CRS-7. 21 Id. National Guard personnel may also have "Title 32" (32 U.S.C. 502(f) (2000)) status, meaning they are still under control of their governor, but receive federal pay and benefits. Bowman, supra note 19, at CRS-8. National Guard personnel under Title 32 status are not constrained by the PCA. Id.; see also U.S. Northern Command, The Posse Comitatus Act, http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/posse_comitatus.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006) . 22 Bowman, supra note 19, at CRS-9. 23 Id. at CRS-7, note 21 and CRS-9; see U.S. Northern Command, supra note 21. Commerce was affected throughout the Nation as result of the hurricane. In its immediate aftermath, the destruction sent thousands of victims across State borders in search of food and shelter and required delivery of relief workers and supplies from across the Nation.
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Major national industries were closed or their operations dramatically cut back. 44 The hurricane severely impaired substantial portions of the country's oil refineries and curtailed offshore production of oil and gas. 45 As a result, the Nation experienced a sharp and immediate spike in gasoline prices.
46
In the absence of a State and local governmental presence, lawlessness consumed the city of New Orleans. It was widely reported that:
• "Looting was widespread, sometimes in full view of outnumbered police and often 47 Id.
• "The police themselves may have helped trigger the lawlessness, as reports that some of their own had engaged in looting swept through the city." 50 This lawlessness contributed to the sub-human conditions experienced at the New Orleans Superdome and Convention Center. The following include some descriptions of the havoc within these structures in which refugees were forced to seek shelter during Katrina: "horrible prison;" "the darkest hole in the world;" "the place I want to forget;" and "hell." 51 The power meant no air conditioning and backed up toilets. 57 The stench was so bad that medical workers wore masks, and thousands of retching people had to be moved outside the dome.
58
One advantage that refugees at the Superdome enjoyed, however, was that those entering that facility had been searched for weapons. 59 Such precautions were not taken at the Ernest N.
Morial Convention Center. 60 Consequently, violence at the Convention Center exceeded even that at the Superdome. 61 The Convention Center was never intended to hold refugees, even as a last resort. 62 Yet, this structure held 15,000 people during those fateful days. 63 Also without power and swelteringly hot, the situation at the Center was described by Captain Winn, the head of the police SWAT team, as "completely lawless." 64 Gunfire was routine. 65 There were several reports of women being dragged off by groups of men and gang-raped. 66 Captain Winn found a corpse with multiple stab wounds in the building. 67 The beleaguered eighty to ninety New
Orleans police officers, already at a severe disadvantage of numbers, could only rush into the darkness with flashlights after seeing muzzle flashes. 68 Even when culprits were caught, no temporary holding cells had been set up to hold them.
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In summary, Katrina was a catastrophe of such magnitude that State and local resources were completely overwhelmed and the respective governmental institutions were diminished to the point of nonexistence. 57 Id. 58 Id.; Salopek, supra note 51. 59 Lipton, supra note 6. 60 Id. 61 Id.; Salopek, supra note 51. 62 Id. 63 Id. 64 Lipton, supra note 6. 65 Id. 66 Id. 67 Salopek, supra note 51. 68 Lipton, supra note 6. 69 Id. 79 Governor Blanco balked at the suggestion, concerned that it was tantamount to a Federal declaration of martial law. 80 The Bush administration then sent Governor Blanco a proposed legal memorandum asking her to request a Federal takeover, which she rejected. 81 She also rejected a more modest proposal for a hybrid command structure, under which a three-star general who had been sworn into the Louisiana National Guard would command all troopsboth State and federalized National Guard and armed services troops.
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These appeasing measures at that stage of crisis were thought to be necessary because the Bush administration then believed that the PCA barred deployment of troops to restore order.
The investigation into the legality of invoking the Insurrection Act, an exception to the PCA that would allow Federal troops to enforce civil law, led to "a flurry of meetings at the Justice as including "helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies;" "managing . . . the Federal government's response to terrorist attacks and major disasters;" "aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters;" "building a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal, State, and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond to such attacks and disasters;" and "consolidating existing Federal government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan."
109
In response to the HSA, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), 110 assigning the DHS Secretary the responsibility of developing a National Incident Management System (NIMS) to provide a "nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity." 111 HSPD-5 also implemented HSA's mandate that "a coordinated national response plan," i.e., the NRP, be developed to In light of the HSA (and HSPD-5 and the NRP which derive from it), the deep and widespread lawlessness that occurred in New Orleans during Katrina would have justified the President in using the military to aid law enforcement to save lives and contain the event.
The Recent Clarifying Amendment to the Insurrection Act
The President's hand in using this power when it was needed during Katrina. 149 The amendment to the Insurrection Act clarifies the power so that neither confusion nor politics need do so again in the future.
Conclusion
In summary, the recent amendment to the Insurrection Act creates a bright line for determining the appropriate use of Federal troops during major domestic natural disasters. The amendment clarifies that under extreme circumstances when local and State governments are overwhelmed by response efforts to a major event such as a natural disaster, the Federal government may use Federal troops to restore public order. Although this power was widely recognized to pre-date the amendment, the confusion surrounding the legality of its use resulted in delays and inaction during Hurricane Katrina that may have cost many lives and imposed great suffering on those who survived. The amendment neither adds to the President's power, nor detracts from the power of the States. It merely ensures that should an event like Katrina occur again, the uncertainty surrounding these powers will not cause similar delays and/or inaction.
